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I. INTRODUCTION
Fresh start! It is an emotional phrase that captures the turbulent sea of
moral and legal tension inherent in the bankruptcy discharge. The phrase itself
conjures up a host of images, running from "deserving debtor" to "deadbeat."
This Article considers the fresh start policy through the most ambitious of all
* Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. Professor Williams served
as the Tax Adviser/Consultant to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission and as Chair of
the Tax Advisory Committee. He thanks his colleagues on the Advisory Committee for their
insights on the topics discussed in this Article. He also thanks his research assistant, Susan
Seabury, forhervaluable assistance. Professor Williams canbe reached atthe following address,
phone number, and e-mail address: P.O. Box 4037, Atlanta, Georgia 30302-4037; 404.651.2139;
jwilliams@gsu.edu.
** Partner, Ellenberg & Ogier, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Tamara Ogier can be reached at the
following address, phone number, and e-mail address: 170 Mitchell St., SW, Atlanta, Georgia
30303; 404.525.4000; tmogier@altlaw.com.
1
Williams and Ogier: A Collusion of Policy: Chapter 13 and Taxes
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
discharges-the Chapter 13 discharge-as it conflicts with the duty of citizens
and residents of the United States to pay their lawful taxes. Part II analyzes the
conflicting policies embodied in Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code' and the
voluntary assessment system embodied in the Internal Revenue Code.2 The
Chapter 13 process, with an emphasis on the discharge provision,3 is carefully
explored with an eye toward highlighting the various statutory embodiments
of the fresh start policy. Additionally, Part II considers the importance of equity
in the United States voluntary compliance tax system. To the extent that the
taxpaying public perceives that a person is shirking his responsibility to pay a
lawful tax, it discredits the system and provides a convenient excuse for
noncompliance.
Part III discusses those categories and types of tax claims that do not
survive the Chapter 7 or 11 discharge.4 In particular, Part III focuses on those
tax claims that survive the Chapter 7 and 11 discharge but fall to the Chapter
13 discharge. These tax claims include those related to fraudulent returns and
to willful attempts to evade or defeat a tax. Part III also rejects the notion that
a good faith requirement-in both the filing of the case and the proposal of the
plan-may serve as an adequate gatekeeper in excluding fraudulent taxpayers
from the bankruptcy process.
Part IV constructs a model of discharge designed to separate those debtors
deserving of the full extent of the Chapter 13 discharge from those debtors that
should forfeit that privilege. Part IV further analyzes the proposals of the Tax
Advisory Committee to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission5 in an
effort to clarify precisely what is at stake in this debate. In summary, the model
would temper the Chapter 13 discharge specifically to prevent those debtors
that have filed fraudulent returns or have engaged in a willful attempt to evade
or defeat a tax from obtaining the Chapter 13 discharge. The historical roots of
the discharge, the policy embodied in the robust Chapter 13 discharge, and a
heightened standard of what constitutes a willful attempt to evade or defeat a
tax provide the basis for this model.
II. CONFLICTING POLICIES
Part II of this Article explores the conflicting policies embodied in Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code and the voluntary assessment system embodied in
the Internal Revenue Code. This conflict presents difficult conceptual issues
highlighted by the dischargeability of tax claims in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
1. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
2. The Internal Revenue Code is codified in Title 26 of the United States Code.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328.
4. See id. § 523(a)(1).
5. See TAX ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT OF THE TAX ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO
THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REvIEW COMMISSION (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter TAX ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT] (on file with author).
[Vol. SO: 313
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CHAPTER 13 AND TAXES
case.
A. Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Relief
As its title states, the purpose of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case is the
adjustment of debts of individuals with regular income.6 The following subpart
of this Article is a discussion of the Chapter 13 process and its requirements
and is designed to provide context to the debate involving the dischargeability
of taxes.
1. Debtor Eligibility
Section 109(e) of the Bankruptcy Code grants eligibility for the filing of
a Chapter 13 reorganization case to any individual with regular income whose
debts do not exceed $250,000 of noncontingent, liquidated, and unsecured
liability, and $750,000 ofnoncontingent, liquidated, and secured liability.7 The
definition of "regular income" is very broad and subject to a variety of
interpretations." The regular income requirement is necessary as a means by
which the Chapter 13 plan is funded.
The time for determining whether the debtor's liabilities satisfy the
eligibility requirement is the date of filing the petition.9 Even if a debtor's
liabilities exceed the dollar limitations set forth in § 109(e), decisions have
indicated that a debtor's ineligibility for Chapter 13 relief does not deprive the
bankruptcy court of jurisdiction to convert the debtor's Chapter 13 case to a
case under Chapter 7.o If it is not determined until after confirmation of a
debtor's Chapter 13 plan that the debtor is not eligible for Chapter 13 relief
because the debtor's liabilities exceed the eligibility dollar limits, authorities
are split as to whether the Chapter 13 plan should be dismissed because the
debtor lacks eligibility under Chapter 13. However, the preferred view is that
the Chapter 13 case should not be dismissed at this stage of the proceeding
because the likelihood of injury is minimal and any creditors who have an
opportunity to object should do so at the appropriate time rather than waiting
until the case has almost reached its conclusion."
The funding of the plan takes place by the debtor making payments to a
6. See W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. & JEFFREY W. MORRIS, CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (1992).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
8. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 15 B.R. 596, 597 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981); In re Dawson, 13
B.R. 107, 109 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981); In re DevalI, 9 B.R. 41,44 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1980); In
re Cole, 3 B.R. 346, 349 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1980).
9. See I1 U.S.C. § 109(e).
10. See Ruddv. Laughlin, 866 F.2d 1040, 1041-42 (8th Cir. 1989); PromenadeNat'l
Bank v. Phillips (In re Phillips), 844 F.2d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1988).
11. See In re Jarvis, 78 B.R. 288, 289 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987). Also see In re Phillips,
844 F.2d at 235 n.2, where the Fifth Circuit cites Jarvis with approval.
1999]
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Chapter 13 trustee pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan. The Chapter 13 trustee, in




If a debtor's Chapter 13 plan "is not filed with the petition, it [must] be
filed within 15 days" after the filing of the petition. 3 Unless the court provides
otherwise, a debtor must "commence making the payments proposed by a plan
within 30 days after the plan is filed.'
' 4
The first element of a Chapter 13 plan is found in § 1302 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which requires that the plan provide for the payment of money through
a trustee. Also, a plan must provide for the payment of debts from the debtor's
disposable income as defined in § 1325(b)(2). 5 The Bankruptcy Code includes
certain mandatory provisions that a Chapter 13 plan must contain. These
provisions include the following:
* The plan must provide for the submission of all or a portion of the
debtor's future earnings to the trustee.'
6
* The plan must provide for full payment to priority claimants under
§ 507 of the Bankruptcy Code, although such claims may be paid
throughout the term of the plan. 7
• The plan must treat all creditors within a particular class in the same
manner.'
8
* The plan must not stretch out the payments for more than three years
12. The Chapter 13 trustee plays a role quite different from its Chapter 7 counterpart.
Instead of being charged with the marshalling and liquidation of assets and the payment of
proceeds from the assets to creditors, the Chapter 13 trustee is entrusted with the duty to pay
creditors a portion of the debtor's future earnings or income pursuant to the terms and conditions
of a confirmed Chapter 13 plan. The United States trustee normally appoints one or more
individuals to serve as standing trustees in cases filed under Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
The trustee's duties are set forth in § 1302(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and include such matters
as presenting arguments to the court concerning the value of property subject to a lien and
confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, advising and assisting the debtor in performance
of the Chapter 13 plan, and "ensur[ing] that the debtor commences making timely payments" as
required by the Chapter 13 plan. Id. § 1302(b)(5). Under normal circumstances; the debtor is
required to send one check each month to the Chapter 13 trustee for all of the monthly payments
due creditors under the Chapter 13 plan. The Chapter 13 trustee then divides the proceeds of the
debtor's monthly check and distributes the debtor's monthly check to the creditors in accordance
with the confirmed Chapter 13 plan.
13. Id. app. Bankr. R. 3015(b).
14. Id. § 1326(a)(1).
15. Seeid. § 1325(b)(2).
16. Id. § 1322(a)(1).
17. Id. § 1322(a)(2).
18. Id. § 1322(a)(3).
[Vol. 50: 313
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or, with the court's approval, a maximum of five years.' 9
The debtor's Chapter 13 plan may also contain a number of permissive
provisions, including modifying the rights of secured claimants (except on the
debtor's principal residence), curing or waiving any defaults, providing for the
assumption or rejection of executory contracts or unexpired leases, and
including any provision not inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code.20 Any
permissive provision of a Chapter 13 plan is, of course, subject to objection by
creditors, by the Chapter 13 trustee, and by the court.
3. Confirmation of Plan
Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is governed by § 1325 of the
Bankruptcy Code. It reads almost like an abbreviated list of plan confirmation
requirements under § 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code for Chapter 11
reorganization cases.2' One of the important confirmation requirements of
§ 1325 is a financial condition test for the protection of unsecured creditors
known as the "best interest of creditors test."' This test requires a court to
determine whether an unsecured creditor would receive less under a Chapter
13 plan than under a Chapter 7 liquidation, and if so, the plan should not be
confirmed. Along with the financial condition test which protects unsecured
creditors, the court may only confirm a Chapter 13 plan if the following
conditions are met:
" The plan must comply with all the provisions of Chapter 13, as well
as any other applicable provision of the Bankruptcy Code.' For
example, a Chapter 13 plan may not be confirmed if it does not
provide for the full payment of priority tax claims as required by
§ 1322(a)(2).24
" Any fees or charges required by law, or by the Chapter 13 plan, must
be paid.
" The plan must be proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law.26
19. Id. § 1322(d).
20. Id. § 1322(b).
21. See id. §§ 1325, 1129(a).
22. See id. § 1325(a)(4).
23. Id. § 1325(a)(1).
24. Id. § 1322(a)(2); see also In re Schenk, 67 B.R. 137, 138-39 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1986) (discussing the nexus between Chapter 13 and § 507) (quoting In re Healis, 49 B.R. 939,
940-41, 942 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985)).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2).
26. Id. § 1325(a)(3); see also Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705
F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding thatgood faith exists when thedebtoracts equitably
in proposing the plan regardless of whether the proposed payment is nominal or substantial).
1999]
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" Secured claims must receive certain protection if the holder of such
claims has not accepted the plan, including retention of the lien
securing the claims or surrender of the collateral to the creditor.27
" The Chapter 13 plan must be feasible; that is, the debtor must be able
to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan.28
If a Chapter 13 trustee or an unsecured creditor objects to confirmation of
the debtor's plan, the debtor must prove that the plan proposes either to pay the
objecting creditor's claim in full or that the plan provides that all of the debtor's
anticipated disposable income will be used to pay creditors.29 Only disposable
income received during the three years following the first payment required by
the plan must be used to pay the creditor.3' Disposable income means the
debtor's income reduced by necessary expenses either for the support of the
debtor and the debtor's dependents or for the continuation, preservation, or
operation of the debtor's business.3
Like its Chapter 11 counterpart, the Chapter 13 debtor may modify the plan
at any time before confirmation. However, the plan may not be modified in
such manner that it no longer complies with § 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code,
which regulates the contents of a plan of reorganization.32 Furthermore, § 1323
of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
Any holder of a secured claim that has [previously]
accepted or rejected the plan is deemed to have accepted or
rejected, as the case may be, the plan as modified, unless the
modification provides for a change in the rights of such
holder from what such rights were under the plan before
modification, and such holder changes such holder's previous
acceptance or rejection.33
Section 1327 of the Bankruptcy Code spells out the effect of the
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan. Initially, "[t]he provisions of a confirmed
[Chapter 13] plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim
of such creditor is provided for by the plan, and whether or not such creditor
has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan."34 However, what
happens if a Chapter 13 plan does not meet the Bankruptcy Code requirement
relating to the full payment of priority tax claims under § 507(a)(8) and the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has not made any objection? The only
27. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
28. Id. § 1325(a)(6).
29. Id. § 1325(b)(1).
30. See id. § 1325(b)(l)(B).
31. Id. § 1325(b)(2).
32. Id. § 1323(a).
33. Id. § 1323(c).
34. Id. § 1327(a).
[Vol. 50: 313
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remedy for the IRS under these circumstances may be to request a modification
of the plan,35 provided, however, the IRS has filed a claim in a timely manner36
or is otherwise treated by the plan. But several cases indicate that a creditor
(including the IRS) may move to modify a plan only on a showing of a default
by the debtor or that the circumstances have changed since confirmation.
Confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan also vests all of the property of the
bankruptcy estate back in the debtor unless the plan or confirmation order
provides otherwise. 38 Thus, the automatic stay39 is terminated as to
postconfirmation debts and property held by the debtor unless the plan provides
that the debtor's property remains property of the debtor's estate.4" Hence, it is
often in a debtor's best interest to include a broad definition of property of the
estate (including such things as postpetition earnings). A broad definition will
serve to protect as much of the debtor's property by the automatic stay as
possible. Of course, the IRS and any other creditor should object to a broad
definition of property of the estate unless a debtor can show good cause.
The property that vests in the debtor after confirmation under § 1327(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code is also free and clear of any claim or interest of any
creditor provided for by the plan.4" However, the phrase "claim or interest"
does not include a valid lien, and thus, valid liens are not discharged by the
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan even if the plan treated the debt underlying
such lien as unsecured.42 Further, removal of the automatic stay after
confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan will allow the IRS, under certain
circumstances, to collect postpetition tax liabilities of the debtor.43
35. See In re Moseley, 74 B.R. 791, 798 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
Once a Chapter 13 plan has been
confirmed, there are seven procedural routes that may
be available to an unsecured creditor to attack the
plan: (1) appeal of the confirmation order; (2) motion
to alter or amend the order, including a motion for
reconsideration or for rehearing; (3) motion to
dismiss the case; (4) motion to correct a clerical
mistake; (5) adversary proceeding to revoke
confirmation; (6) motion to set aside the confirmation
on due process grounds; (7) motion to modify the
Chapter 13 plan.
Id. (footnote omitted).
36. See, e.g., id. at 801; In re Pine Assocs., Inc., 35 B.R. 49, 50 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1983).
37. See, e.g., In re Gronski, 86 B.R. 428,432 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Moseley,
74 B.R. at 799; In re Toth, 61 B.R. 160, 166 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b); see also id. § 1306(b) (stating that "the debtor shall remain
in possession of all property of the estate" except as otherwise provided).
39. See id. § 362(a).
40. Id. § 362(c)-(d).
41. Id. § 1327(c).
42. See Simmons v. Savell (In re Simmons), 765 F.2d 547, 557-59 (5th Cir. 1985).
43. See In re Dickey, 64 B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
1999]
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4. Scope ofDischarge
The Chapter 13 discharge is much broader in scope than either the Chapter
7 discharge or the Chapter 11 discharge. Under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, when
the debtor is an individual, a creditor that persuades the court to except its debt
under § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is not subject to any discharge order
and may enforce its claim even after discharge or plan confirmation. This is not
so, however, in a Chapter 13 case. Under § 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
almost all debts provided for in the Chapter 13 plan are discharged on
completion of performance of the plan, including many of those debts that are
nondischargeable under § 523(a) in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases. The only
debts that are not discharged are those for alimony and support payments,
certain educational loans, damages related to death or personal injury caused
by the debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while the debtor was intoxicated,
and criminal restitution." Consequently, Chapter 13 may be a more useful tool
for the debtor who has a substantial amount of debt which a court may find
nondischargeable under § 523(a).
Unlike the more limited Chapter 11 discharge that arises at the time the
plan is confirmed, the Chapter 13 discharge arises only after the debtor has
completed full performance under the Chapter 13 plan.4" What happens, then,
to the Chapter 13 right to discharge if the debtor is unable to complete
performance under the plan? The answer to this question is found in § 1328(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code: If a Chapter 13 debtor cannot perform under the plan
for reasons beyond the debtor's control, the debtor may still receive a
"hardship" discharge as long as the debtor has performed sufficiently so that
the creditors have received more under the Chapter 13 plan (even though only
partially performed) than such creditors would have received under a Chapter
7 liquidation."
Even though a hardship discharge is available under the Bankruptcy Code,
a Chapter 13 debtor that is given a hardship discharge pays a high price for
obtaining it. If a hardship discharge is granted, the Chapter 13 debtor is not
discharged from any debt of a kind specified in § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code which would otherwise have been discharged if the Chapter 13 plan had
been fully performed.47
Because the discharge covers "all debts provided for by the plan,"48 the
critical issue is frequently the interpretation of the phrase "provided for by the
plan." In the tax area, the issue is the ability of the Chapter 13 debtor to
discharge priority tax claims, 49 even though such claims may have been
44. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 1328(a).
45. See id.
46. See id. § 1328(b).
47. Id. § 1328(c).
48. Id. § 1328(a).
49. See id. § 507(a)(8).
[Vol. 50: 313
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"provided for" in the debtor's plan, but not actually paid. Suppose, for
example, that the debtor's Chapter 13 plan provides that the debtor will "pay
100% of allowed claims to the IRS." Suppose further that the IRS receives
timely notice of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, but does not file its proof of
claim in a timely manner, and is legitimately owed a designated amount of
prepetition taxes that qualify as a priority unsecured claim under § 507(a)(8)
of the Bankruptcy Code. On consummation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, are
the prepetition priority taxes owed to the IRS discharged?
Section 1322(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a plan must provide
for full payment in deferred cash payments of all priority claims. However, in
the above example authority exists that supports the debtor's position that the
debtor will be discharged from the prepetition priority taxes owed to the IRS
because the taxes were "provided for" under the debtor's plan and (fortunately,
for the debtor) the IRS failed to file its proof of claim in a timely manner."0
A plan for the adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income in
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case must give special treatment to priority claims.
Under § 1322 of the Bankruptcy Code (which deals with the contents of a
Chapter 13 plan), the plan must provide for the full payment of all claims
entitled to priority under § 507.51 A variety of claims for federal taxes are given
priority status under § 507. These priority tax claims include the following:
" Taxes incurred during the administration of the estate, trust fund taxes
on wages or salaries earned and paid after the bankruptcy petition was
filed, and quickie tax refunds;"2
" Tax claims arising after the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy
50. See Leber v. Illinois Dep't of Revenue (In re Leber), 134 B.R. 911, 915-16
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991); Border v. IRS (In re Border), 116 B.R. 588, 595 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1990); Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 102 B.R. 790, 794-96 (E.D. Wash. 1989), aff'd
per curiam, 907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Workman v. United States (In re Workman),
108 B.R. 826, 830 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that the penalty claim of the IRS against a
Chapter 13 debtor was a "prepetition" claim and was barred because the IRS failed to file a
timely proof of claim); Daniel v. United States (In re Daniel), 107 B.R. 798,802-03 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1989) (holding that the tax claim of the IRS was "provided for" under the debtor's Chapter
,13 plan, and such claim was therefore discharged on completion of the plan) (citing Tomlan, 102
B.R. at 790).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2); see, e.g., Bates v. United States (In re Bates), 974 F.2d
1234, 1236 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Harbaugh, 153 B.R. 54, 56 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); In re
Davis, 25 B.R. 177, 178 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982). However, the debtor and the holder of a
particular priority claim under § 507 can agree to a different treatment of such claim. See 11
U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2); In re Sorge, 149 B.R. 197, 202-03 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993); In re Eden,
141 B.R. 121, 125 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992); United States v. Carr, 142 B.R. 351, 353 (D. Neb.
1992); In re Ferguson, 134 B.R. 689, 692,694-95 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); In re Buzek, 116 B.R.
82, 84 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990); In re Burden, 109 B.R. 107, 113 (E.D. Pa. 1989); In re
Williams, 109 B.R. 179, 182 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1989); In re Jourdan, 108 B.R. 1020, 1023
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989); see also In re Gregory, 143 B.R. 424,426 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992);
In re Hageman, 108 B.R. 1016, 1019 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1989).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).
1999]
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petition but before a trustee is appointed or before the entry of an order
for relief;53
" Certain employment taxes on prepetition wages;
54
" Unsecured tax claims of governmental units, including certain income
and gross receipts taxes, trust fund taxes, prepetition employment
taxes, excise taxes, customs duties, and tax penalties.'-
Section 1326 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that all claims given
priority status by § 507(a)(1) must be paid either before or at the same time
payment is made to all creditors under the Chapter 13 plan. 6 Hence, federal
taxes given a first priority status as administrative expenses must be paid (as
required by § 1326) along with the payment of a trustee's fees and other
administrative expenses. Section 1325(a)(4) sets forth the "best interest of
creditor's test," providing that the value of property to be distributed under the
plan to unsecured claimants must not be less than the amount that would be
paid on each claim if the debtor's estate were liquidated under Chapter 7. This
provision raises two questions: If the liquidation of the debtor's estate under
Chapter 7 will result in full payment of all allowed unsecured claims, is the
debtor then required to pay interest on such claims under a Chapter 13 plan
which specifies a payout term of three to five years? Further, should the IRS
also receive interest on its unsecured priority claim because § 1322(a)(2)
requires the full payment of all prepetition priority tax claims under § 507(a)(8)
in a Chapter 13 case?
Case authority suggests that when the liquidation of a debtor's estate under
Chapter 7 results in the full payment of all allowed unsecured claims, the
Chapter 13 debtor cannot defer payment of such claims without including an
appropriate interest payment to such creditors.5 7 Likewise, the IRS will contend
that it is entitled to present value treatment, including interest, of any
prepetition unsecured priority tax claims under § 507(a)(8) if such claims
would have been fully paid in a Chapter 7 case, because § 1322(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code "provide[s] for the full payment, in deferred cash payments"
of all priority tax claims in a Chapter 13 case. Of course, if the IRS receives
only part of its priority tax claim in a Chapter 7 liquidation case, the IRS is not
entitled to interest on any deferred payments in the Chapter 13 plan under
present law.
After a debtor has made all payments required by the Chapter 13 plan, the
bankruptcy court "grant[s] the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by
53. Id. § 507(a)(2).
54. Id. § 507(a)(3).
55. Id. § 507(a)(8).
56. See id. § 1326(b)(2).
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the plan or disallowed under section 502,""s except the following:
" The curing of any default and continuation of payments while a case
is pending on any claim which has a final due date after the final day
of the Chapter 13 plan;59
" The debt owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child for alimony,
maintenance, or support in connection with a separation agreement,
divorce decree, or property settlement agreement;
60
" A debt owed for an educational loan which is insured or guaranteed by
a governmental unit;6'
" A debt relating to death or personal injury caused by the debtor's
operation of a motor vehicle while the debtor was intoxicated from the
use of alcohol or drugs;62 and
" A debt for restitution included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction
of a crime.63
Section 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not exclude taxes from any
discharge of debts that the bankruptcy court grants to a Chapter 13 debtor.
However, all priority tax claims under § 507 must be paid in full as required by
§ 1322(a)(2). Nonetheless, certainnonpriority tax claims are only dischargeable
in a Chapter 13 case. These claims include the various tax claims as set forth
in § 523(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code concerning taxes relating to a late,
unfiled, or fraudulent return" and to those taxes related to a willful attempt to
evade or defeat a tax.65
Because the discharge covers "all debts provided forby the plan," a critical
issue is frequently the interpretation of the phrase "provided for by the plan,"
as noted earlier. This issue arises in the tax area when determining the ability
of a Chapter 13 debtor to discharge priority tax claims even though such claims
may have been "provided for" in the debtor's plan, but not actually paid.66
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
59. Id. §§ 1322(b)(5), 1328(a)(l).
60. Id. §§ 523(a)(5), 1328(a)(2).
61. Id. §§ 523(a)(8), 1328(a)(2).
62. Id. §§ 523(a)(9), 1328(a)(2).
63. Id. § 1328(a)(3).
64. Id. § 523(a)(1)(B)-(C).
65. Id. § 523(a)(1)(C).
66. The Advisory Committee proposed No. 441 (a), entitled "Obligation of a Chapter
13 Debtor to Pay All Priority Taxes When a Proof of Claim for Such Taxes Is Not Filed." TAX
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 104. Those in support of this proposal stated:
Section 1322(a)(2) provides that all Chapter 13 plans
provide for the payment of all claims entitled to
priority under § 507. Courts, however, construe
§ 1322 to require only that a Chapter 13 plan provide
for payment of allowed claims. A claim cannot be an
allowed claim under Chapter 13 unless a proof of
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Under present law, if a plan provides for payment of allowed priority claims
and a proof of claim for priority taxes is not filed before the bar date, two
consequences may occur: first, the IRS will not receive any distribution with
respect to the claim, and second, because the plan "provided for" the tax claim,
the claim will be dishcarged under § 1328.67
A discharge obtained by the debtor through fraud can be revoked, after
notice and a hearing, provided the request for revocation is made within one
year after the discharge is granted, and the requesting party did not know of the
fraud until after the discharge was granted. 8 If a debtor cannot perform under
the plan for reasons beyond the debtor's control, the debtor may still receive a
"hardship" discharge as long as the creditors have received more under the
Chapter 13 plan (even though only partially performed) than those creditors
would have received under a Chapter 7 liquidation.69 Even though a hardship
discharge is available under the Bankruptcy Code, the Chapter 13 debtor pays
a high price for obtaining it because the debtor is then not discharged from any
of the following debts:
claim is filed.... The current treatment of priority
tax claims in Chapter 13 cases provides an unjustified
benefit to many debtors who are delinquent in their
taxes. Frequently, the debtor is a nonfiler; thus, the
taxing authority may not know of the liability, much
less the amount. Further, the debtor may be a
responsible person of a corporation and thus be liable
for trust fund tax recovery penalties. If the individual
debtor's case makes no reference to the corporation,
the taxing authority may not connect the individual
debtor to the delinquent corporation until after the bar
date. Finally, if the taxing authority mistakenly fails
to file a proof of claim in time, the entire liability is
discharged.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
Those arguing against the proposal observed:
The taxing authorities should have no greater rights
in this respect than any other priority creditor. The
two driving concerns-reasonable notice and filing
return requirements-are adequately addressed by
otherproposals. Given adequate notice, a return filing
requirement, and the 180-day bar date, the taxing
authority should be required to file timely its proof of
claim like any other holder of a priority claim.
Id. at 104-05.
By a vote ofseven to two with one abstention, the Advisory Committee recommended
that the Commission reject the proposal. Id. at 105.
67. See Border v. IRS (In re Border), 116 B.R. 588, 591-95 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990);
Daniel v. United States (In re Daniel), 107 B.R. 798, 802-03 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989); Ledlin v.
United States (In re Tomlan), 102 B.R. 790, 792-97 (E.D. Wash. 1989), aff'dper curiam, 907
F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990).
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(e).
69. Id. § 1328(b).
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* Debts relating to the curing of any default and the continuation of
payments while a case is pending on any kind of claim where the last
payment is due after the final payment is due under the Chapter 13
plan; and
" Any debt of a kind specified under § 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which includes tax claims given a second priority as involuntary gap
claims under § 507(a)(2); prepetition priority tax claims under
§ 507(a)(8); tax liabilities relating to a tax return which was either not
filed, filed late, or filed after the bankruptcy petition; tax liabilities
reported by fraudulent returns; and certain tax penalties.70
B. Duty to Report and Pay Taxes
Tax revenues are one of the building blocks of society. These revenues
help pay for the cost of government, military defense, roads, education, parks,
and recreational areas; and the list can go on. These outlays are beneficial to all
people whether or not they have paid a tax. Consequently, an incentive exists
to avoid paying a tax, shifting the burden to others.7' Notwithstanding the
incentive to "cheat," the American tax system is one of voluntary compliance
and assessment. Each year as we prepare and sign our Form 1040, we are
voluntarily assessing an income tax against ourselves. Thus, every person is
expected to account annually for their income and deductions, file the
appropriate forms and schedules, and pay the tax owed.
To foster voluntary compliance, the federal government must impose taxes
that are perceived as fair and equitable.72 Additionally, because of the incentive
to cheat coupled with the voluntary compliance nature of the American tax
system, the federal government must also penalize those individuals that do not
play along. The Treasury Department, through the IRS, has the primary
responsibility for tax compliance, collection, and enforcement. The IRS has at
its disposal an array of tools to aid in the assessment, collection, and
enforcement of taxes. One obvious tool is the criminal justice process. Typical
federal tax crimes include (1) attempted evasion,73 (2) willful failure to file or
to pay,74 (3) false statement,7 (4) aiding and assisting,76 (5) submitting a false
document,77 and (6) impeding or obstructing administration of the Internal
70. Id. § 1328(c); see, e.g., In re Quick, 152 B.R. 902, 908 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992).
71. DANIELQ. PosiN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 33 (3d ed. 1997).
72. See JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., ANALYSIS OFPROPOSALS RELATING
TO COMPREHENSIV TAX REFORM 3-7 (Comm. Print 1985).
73. I.R.C. § 7201 (1994).
74. Id. § 7203.
75. Id. § 7206(1).
76. Id. § 7206(2).
77. Id. § 7207.
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Revenue Code.78
An additional tool employed by the IRS is the imposition and collection of
penalties and interest. Presently, four broad categories of penalties exist. These
include information reporting penalties;79 accuracy penalties; 0 preparer,
promoter, and protestor penalties;8 and delinquency penalties. 2 The IRS has
the power to assess and collect not only the tax owed, but also the interest and
penalties associated with the unpaid tax.
That a delinquent taxpayer may have sufficient funds to pay the tax, but
insufficient assets to pay the additional penalties and interest is not unusual. Of
course, finding a taxpayer that cannot pay any of the tax owed is not unusual
either. Thus, it is not surprising that many of these taxpayers file for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, the IRS is the largest creditor in
bankruptcy, filing well over 150,000 proofs of claim for delinquent federal
taxes in bankruptcy each year.83 Some of these taxpayers have the best of
intentions in seekingbankruptcy relief, including, in some instances, an attempt
to reenter the voluntary tax compliance system. Others have the worst of
intentions in seeking bankruptcy relief, including using the bankruptcy process
in a continuing effort to evade the payment of taxes. Identifying members of
each camp is not as simple as it may seem.
III. TAXES AND THE CHAPTER 13 DISCHARGE
Tax-driven Chapter 13 cases are no longer the exception, but the rule. In
many Chapter 13 cases a debtor is delinquent in the payment of taxes. To be
sure, many of those who seek Chapter 13 relief in an effort to address tax
deficiencies are not abusing the system in any objective sense; nonetheless,
many debtors do employ the Chapter 13 process as part of a pattern to evade
or defeat a tax. Thus, that the IRS refers to the Chapter 13 process as a "fertile
area for tax avoidance and. . . 'the tax shelter of the 90's"' should not be
surprising." To an extent, this characterization is true, and to an extent, it is
hyperbole.
This Part begins with a discussion of the present state of law regarding
taxes and the Chapter 13 discharge. Specifically, it examines the development
of the law as it relates to the treatment of fraudulent taxes and those taxes
associated with a willful attempt to evade or defeat a tax. Both of these
78. Id. § 7212(a). For an introduction to these and related crimes in the tax context,
see PATRICIA T. MORGAN, TAX PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD IN A NUTSHELL 298-324 (1990).
79. I.R.C. §§ 6011, 6038, 6721-24.
80. Id. §§ 6662-65.
81. Id. §§ 6672-73, 6694-95, 6700-02, 7216, 7407.
82. Id. § 6656.
83. Letter from Internal Revenue Service to National Bankruptcy Review Commission
I (Aug. 28, 1996) (on file with author).
84. Letter from Internal Revenue Service to National Bankruptcy Review Commission
2 (Aug. 28, 1996) (on file with author).
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categories of taxes are nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case, but
may be discharged in a Chapter 13 case. 85
One of the safeguards embedded in Chapter 13 to prevent, among other
things, tax abuse is a good faith requirement. Section 1325(a)(3) requires that
a Chapter 13 plan be filed in good faith, and, despite the fact that there is no
good faith requirement in § 1307(c), many courts have engrafted just such a
requirement in Chapter 13 cases. This Part shows that although, in theory, the
good faith safeguard may have meaning, in practice it is much too thin a wedge
upon which to build a protective wall from abuse.
A. Fraudulent Taxes
Although the federal income tax applies to all United States citizens and
all residents of the United States, not every citizen or resident must file a tax
return.86 Generally, filing requirements are triggered by the amount of income
an individual taxpayer may receive without having to pay a tax. 7 This amount
is equal to the applicable standard deduction plus the personal exemption.
Thus, an individual taxpayer must file a return if the individual has gross
income in excess of the applicable standard deduction plus the personal
exemption amount.
The failure to file a required return or the filing of a false return constitutes
a federal tax crime. 8 The federal government may also impose civil penalties
and interest for the failure to file returns or the filing of fraudulent returns. The
burden of proof is on the IRS to establish three elements with respect to a
fraudulent return: (1) debtor's knowledge of the falsehood of the return; (2)
debtor's intent to evade the taxes; and (3) an underpayment of taxes. 9 Thus, it
is not surprising that debts related to unfiled returns," certain late-filed
returns, 9' and fraudulent returns 92 are excepted from both the Chapter 7 and
85. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C) (1994) (prohibiting a debt to be discharged
from a debtor that "made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or
defeat such tax") with id. § 1328(a) (instructing courts not to discharge debts in § 523(a)(1)
situations).
86. See I.R.C. §§ 6011-17.
87. Id.
88. See id. §§ 7203 (providing that willful failure to file or pay tax is a misdemeanor),
7206(1) (providing that filing a false statement is a felony).
89. Brackin v. United States (In re Brackin), 148 B.R. 953, 956 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1992); Hopkins v. United States (In re Hopkins), 133 B.R. 102, 106 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991);
Kirk v. United States (In re Kirk), 98 B.R. 51, 55 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i); Polly S. Higdon & Kenneth C. Weil, Priority and
Dischargeability of Taxes 12-14 (May 1993)(unpublished article, on file with author).
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(ii); Higdon & Weil, supra note 90, at 12-14.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C); Higdon & Weil, supra note 90, at 14-15. Fraud in
this context generally means the failure to report income. See, e.g., Levinson v. United States,
969 F.2d 260, 261 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Brackin, 148 B.R. at 958.
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Chapter 11 discharge.93 The problem is that these tax debts are not excepted
from the Chapter 13 discharge. 94 To be sure, the good faith requirement for
confirmation of plans in Chapter 13"s could be used as a gatekeeper; however,
as discussed below, the requirement is ill-considered and too thin a wedge to
build a wall against debtors who engaged in tax fraud. In the debate
surrounding the proper scope of the Chapter 13 discharge, there was little
serious controversy in amending § 1328(a) to deny discharge of taxes related
to a fraudulent return or a failure to file a return. The more difficult question is
posed by § 523(a)(1)(C), which excepts discharged debts related to a willful
attempt to evade or defeat a tax from Chapters 7 and 11, but not Chapter 13.
B. Willful Attempt to Evade or Defeat a Tax
For the sake of argument, assume that most people do not want to provide
a discharge of tax liabilities related to a debtor's fraudulent activity. This is a
reasonable policy position and is embodied in Chapter 7 and 11 ases.96
However, just what type of conduct constitutes a "willful[] attempt[] ... to
evade or defeat [a] tax"'97 defies simplistic attempts to articulate. This
definitional stage is where one of the most heated of bankruptcy-tax
controversies begins.
Courts generally insist on a fact-intensive approach to fraudulent conduct,
requiring a sifting of the facts and circumstances to determine whether the
alleged conduct rises to a sufficient level of culpability to justify the denial of
the discharge of the taxes.9" Thus, not all of the badges of fraud must be present
for the court to conclude that the taxes should not be discharged. Furthermore,
in the appropriate circumstances, the existence of but one badge may permit a
court to stamp the conduct of the taxpayer as fraudulent. "Badges of fraud"
include the substantial understatement of income, keeping and maintaining
inadequate records, implausible or inconsistent explanations of behavior,
attempting to conceal illegal activities, dealing in cash, failing to make
estimated tax payments, backdating checks, filing false documents, and failing
to file returns.99 Case law suggests that affirmative acts such as the concealment
of assets to defeat tax collection efforts,"0 signing a false return knowing the
93. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)-(C).
94. See id. § 1328(a).
95. See id. § 1325(a)(3).
96. See generally id. § 523(a)(l)-(17) (enumerating exceptions to discharge).
97. Id. § 523(a)(1)(C).
98. See, e.g., Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123-25 (1983).
99. See Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307 (9th Cir. 1986); Recklitis v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 874, 910 (1988).
100. See Jones v. United States (In re Jones), 116 B.R. 810, 814 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1990). Concealment should also include fraudulent omissions of assets from a collection
information statement or other documents provided to the IRS in the collection process. Id.
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return to be false,"°' reducing income to avoid a tax levy but keeping cash flow
constant by borrowing from the employer, °2 transferring property into trust to
frustrate tax collection efforts,1 3 filing false Form W-4 forms,'0 4 or failing to
file returns coupled with failing to report substantial amounts of income for
several years may constitute indicia of fraud sufficient to render the conduct
fraudulent.'05
Affirmative acts by the taxpayer to attempt willfully to evade or defeat a
tax are the easy cases, if such a thing exists. More difficult are the cases in
which the taxpayer has simply failed to pay a tax (with or without a lavish
lifestyle) or has failed to file returns.
Two cases adequately capture the general debate regarding the willful
attempt to defeat or evade taxes. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in
Haas v. IRS (In re Haas),0 6 was in the difficult position of deciding whether
a debtor's mere failure to pay his tax liability should result in the
nondischargeability of any tax liability. The court found the nonpayment of
taxes not to be included within § 523(a)(1)(C) and that omissions do not satisfy
§ 523(a)(1)(C) 0 7 Essentially, the Eleventh Circuit embraced a willfulness
standard similar to the criminal tax standard.0 8 This standard requires the
government to prove that "the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the
defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated
that duty."'0 9 The debtor must have committed an affirmative act in attempt to
evade a tax liability;"0 mere omissions are not enough to affect
dischargeability."'
In contrast, in Toti v. United States (In re Tot)" 2 the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the debtor's failure to file returns was an omission which
led to nondischargeability under § 523(a)(1)(C) and that attempts to avoid
payment are included within § 523(a)(1)(C).1 3 The Fifth Circuit Court of
101. Hopkins v. United States (In re Hopkins), 133 B.R. 102, 107 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1991).
102. Sells v. United States (In re Sells), 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,070, at 83,284
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
103. United States v. Sumpter (In re Sumpter), 136 B.R. 690, 700-01 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1991).
104. Ermenc v. IRS (In re Ermenc), 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,317, at 85,016-17
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992).
105. Berzon v. United States (In re Berzon), 145 B.R. 247,251-53 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1992).
106. 48 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 1995).
107. Id. at 1156-57.
108. See, e.g., id. at 1157; Gathwright v. United States (In re Gathwright), 102 B.R.
211,213 (Bankr. D. Or. 1989).
109. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
110. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943).
111. Haas, 48 F.3d at 1158; Howard v. United States (In re Howard), 167 B.R. 684,
688 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); Gathwright, 102 B.R. at 213.
112. 24 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 809.
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Appeals, in Bruner v. United States (In re Bruner),'1 4 endorsed the view of the
Sixth Circuit, although it appeared to apply a standard closer to the Eleventh
Circuit's in Haas than to the Sixth Circuit's in Toti. "5 Essentially, the Sixth
Circuit, like a majority of courts, adopted the civil standard of willfulness."i
6
Courts applying this standard generally equate "willful" with "voluntary,
conscious, and intentional evasions of tax liabilities.""7 Under the civil
standard, the government is not required to prove an affirmative act on the part
of the debtor in order to find that he "willfully attempted to evade or defeat" the
tax. In other words, acts or omissions are considered willful under the civil
standard.""8
Consistent with the majority of courts that have addressed the issue are the
words of a distinguished commentator:
With respect to tax evasion, the discharge exception
should apply both to acts of omission as well as acts of
commission. Thus, the voluntary, conscious, and intentional
failure to file required tax returns and pay taxes when the
debtor had the wherewithal to do so is a willful attempt to
evade or defeat the debtor's tax liability within the meaning
of Code § 523(a)(1)(C). Courts have overwhelmingly held
that a willful attempt "in any manner" to "evade or defeat" a
tax includes a willful attempt to evade or defeat payment on
the tax.'19
In a note on the subject, Lynn M. Murtha elegantly captures the debate:
114. 55 F.3d 195 (5th Cir. 1995).
115. Id. at 197 n.4; see United States v. Sumpter (In re Sumpter), Nos. 94-1439, 94-
1440, 1995 WL 501947, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 1995).
116. Toti, 24 F.3d at 809; Pierce v. United States (In re Pierce), 184 B.R. 338, 343
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995); Binkley v. United States (In re Binkley), 176 B.R. 260, 265 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1994); Irvine v. Commissioner (In re Irvine), 163 B.R. 983, 987 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994); United States v. Hedgecock (In re Hedgecock), 160 B.R. 380, 385 (D. Or. 1993); Jones
v. United States (In re Jones), 116 B.R. 810, 814 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1990).
117. Toti, 24 F.3d at 809. Some courts purport to apply the civil standard of
willfulness by requiring the government to prove that: (1) the debtor had a duty to pay the tax;
(2) the debtor knew of the duty to pay the tax; and (3) the debtor voluntarily and intentionally
violated this duty. See, e.g., Bruner, 55 F.3d at 197 n.4; Laurin v. United States (In re Laurin),
161 B.R. 73, 75 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1993); Commissioner v. Peterson (In re Peterson), 152 B.R.
329, 335 (D. Wyo. 1993). However, this standard is the criminal standard for willfulness set
forth by the Supreme Court in Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
118. Bruner, 55 F.3d at 200; Toti, 24 F.3d at 809; Pierce, 184 B.R. at 343; Miller v.
United States (In re Miller), 176 B.R. 266, 268 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994); Binkley, 176 B.R. at
264; United States v. Angel (In re Angel), Bankr. No. 93-1 1683-BH, 1994 WL 69516, at *2
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 1994).
119. 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTIcE 2D § 47.7
(William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 1997) (footnotes omitted).
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So, to juxtapose the two standards, the criminal standard
of "willfulness" today requires an affirmative act by which
the taxpayer voluntarily and intentionally violates a known
legal duty. Under the civil standard, "willfulness" requires a
voluntary, conscious, and intentional act or omission. Both
standards require a voluntary and intentional act. Neither
standard is satisfied by negligent acts, and neither standard
requires a bad intent or evil motive except to the extent that
under the criminal standard, the taxpayer must have the intent
to violate a known legal duty. The two standards become
even more similar when the examples of affirmative acts
contemplated under Spies (the criminal standard) are
compared to the "badges of fraud" relied upon by some
courts adopting the civil standard. Thus, the primary
difference between the two standards is the inclusion or
exclusion of omissions as conduct constituting willfulness.
20
Notwithstanding the cogent reasons given to justify inclusion of omissions
within the ambit of tax evasion under § 523(a)(1)(C), Haas states the better
view that the nonpayment of taxes was not intended to be included within
§ 523(a)(1)(C) and that omissions generally do not satisfy § 523(a)(1)(C)."2 '
Debtors generally file for relief under the Bankruptcy Code because they
cannot pay their lawful debts, including tax obligations. To fashion a
nondischargeability provision from the very act that leads most folks into
bankruptcy is quite peculiar. Therefore, § 523(a)(1)(C) should be reserved for
instances in which the debtor has engaged in culpable behavior which warrants
the nondischargeability of tax liabilities. In this respect the IRS should be
treated like any other creditor, and the Bankruptcy Code policy requiring strict
construction of exceptions to discharge should be given effect.
The debate over the contours of the tax evasion provision in § 523(a)(1)(C)
will not end here. The more relevant inquiry to this Article, however, is why
any interpretation of § 523(a)(1)(C) previously advanced would nonetheless
fall to the Chapter 13 discharge.
C. Good Faith as a Gatekeeper
Although § 1307(c) of the Bankruptcy Code does not include the bad faith
filing of a Chapter 13 plan as a statutory ground for dismissal of a Chapter 13
case, § 1325(a)(3) does provide that the Chapter 13 plan must be proposed in
120. Lynn M. Murtha, Note, "Willfulness" and Attempts to Evade or Defeat Taxes
Under the Bankruptcy Code's Section 523 (a) (1) (C) Exception to Discharge, 3 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 469,478 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
121. See Haas v. IRS (In re Haas), 48 F.3d 1153, 1156-57 (1 1th Cir. 1995).
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good faith as a condition of confirmation of the plan." Unfortunately, even
though courts are willing to dismiss cases in the event of an abuse of the
bankruptcy process, the Bankruptcy Code does not define "good faith," no
legislative history explains "good faith," and literally hundreds of decisions
have produced inconsistent results in the conversion or dismissal of Chapter 13
cases for an alleged bad faith filing."
In reviewing these decisions, one must consider that the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA")' 24 amended
portions of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby eliminating certain issues that courts
confronted on a regular basis prior to 1984 to determine whether a Chapter 13
debtor had made a bad faith filing. For example, § 109(g)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code now specifically forbids a debtor, in certain circumstances, from refiling
for bankruptcy relief within 180 days of a voluntary dismissal of a previous
case. 2 This addition to the Bankruptcy Code reduced the importance of court
evaluation of repetitive bankruptcy filings as indicative of a lack of good faith.
Additionally, § 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code shows that a plan proposed in
good faith does not require any specific amount or percentage of payments to
unsecured creditors, 26 whereas prior to BAFJA, courts analyzed whether a
Chapter 13 plan proposed substantial or meaningful repayments to unsecured
creditors in determining "good faith."'
127
Unfortunately, clear instruction on how to attack successfully a Chapter 13
case on the basis of a bad faith filing does not exist; there are no charts that
enlighten us. Rather, the cases defie "good faith" based on a general feel for
the case. As the Seventh Circuit has observed, "'[a] comprehensive definition
of good faith is not practical."128 A recent case decided by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals is illustrative of the problem. In In re Smith2 9 a Chapter 13
debtor "fleeced senior citizens" in the state of Indiana by making repairs the
debtor knew were unnecessary. 30 As a result, the state obtained a judgment
122. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1307(c), 1325(a)(3) (1994); see also Bradley M. Elbein, The Hole
in the Code: Good Faith and Morality in Chapter 13, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 439, 448 n.45
(1997) (indicating that courts disagree as to whether there is an implied good faith finding
requirement in Chapter 13).
123. For an excellent article on this topic, see Elbein, supra note 122 at 450-56; see
also hr re Lilley, 185 B.R. 489,493 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (recognizing that an action can be dismissed
for breach of the implicit good faith requirement in Chapter 13), rev'd, 91 F.3d 491 (3d Cir.
1996).
124. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 109(g)(2).
126. See, e.g., Ravenotv. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426,431 (7th Cir. 1982).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b).
128. Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 431 (quoting Tenney v. Terry (In re Terry), 630 F.2d 634,
635 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980) (quoting 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9.20, at 319 (James Wm. Moore
et al. eds., 14th ed. 1978))).
129. 848 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1988).
130. Id. at 814.
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against the debtor under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act in the
approximate amount of $49,000, most of which was to be held in escrow for
distribution to those senior citizens who had been fleeced by the debtor.' The
debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition and proposed a plan providing for a monthly
payment of $115.41.132 The total payout to the state of Indiana was projected
at two percent of the state's claim at which point the debtor's obligation to the
state would be discharged. 1
3
The bankruptcy court found that the debtor's plan was proposed in good
faith, but expressly excluded evidence concerning how the debts arose, stating
that "[a] debtor's prepetition activities do not enter into the Court's
evaluation."134 The district court affirmed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed and
remanded with direction that the bankruptcy.court review the "totality of the
circumstances" and determine whether or not the debtor's Chapter 13 plan was
filed in good faith and whether it should be confirmed.
13
In essence, the Seventh Circuit found that the bankruptcy court erred in
failing to consider the "totality of the circumstances" in which the debtor's
debts arose and that, but for the Chapter 13 filing, such debts would otherwise
be nondischargeable.' 36 Further, the court directed the bankruptcy court to
consider that the debtor "relied upon the favorable prospect of using
bankruptcy law to avoid repaying his fraudulently won gains.''
In Smith the Seventh Circuit analyzed a number of other decisions which
had struggled with the issue of the good faith filing requirement in Chapter 13
cases.138 Many of the cases that wrestle with the good faith issue articulate lists
of various relevant factors in determining whether good faith exists. 3"
However, Professors Epstein, Nickles, and White, in their hornbook on
bankruptcy law, suggest that a better approach is to consider those acts which
might be regarded as amounting to bad faith, 4 ° such as a small Chapter 13
payment, a term of less than three years, dishonesty, treating some creditors
worse than others, gross modification of the rights of secured creditors,
repetitious filings, and prebankruptcy behavior.'4' These authors conclude that
the real problem in deciding the "good faith" issue is Congress's failure to
131. Id.
132. Id. at 814-15.
133. Id. at 815.
134. Id. at 815-16.
135. Id. at 816, 821-22.
136. Id. at 821.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 817-20.
139. See Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222,1227 & n.6 (8th Cir.
1987); In re Chaffin, 816 F.2d 1070,1073-74 (5th Cir. 1987); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149,
152-53 (4th Cir. 1986); Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d
885, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426,
431-32 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Sutliff, 79 B.R. 151, 154 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987).
140. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ETAL., BANKRUPTCY § 9-14, at 704 (1993).
141. Id. § 9-14, at 704-07.
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establish clear rules for courts to follow.
Some, like the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in the Ninth
Circuit, say Congress must have intended some difference
between the low payout liquidation under which certain debts
are not discharged in Chapter 7 and the same transaction in
Chapter 13 where those debts are discharged. It is Congress'
failure to state its own mind clearly that has left the courts
fumbling through these various factors and apparently
contradicting what Congress directed while attempting to do
what Congress intended. 42
Courts have been particularly reluctant to allow a debtor to proceed in a
Chapter 13-have found bad faith-where there is a pattern of tax evasion or
avoidance culminating the filing of the bankruptcy.'43 For example, in In re
Marcellus,'" the Seven Circuit Court of Appeals affmned a bankruptcy court
decision that dismissed a Chapter 13 filing for bad faith and prohibited the
debtor from filing a petition under Title 11 for two years. The court found that
in a previous bankruptcy action the debtor had failed to pay overdue income
taxes despite a court order to do so, had failed to file any income taxes since
1984, had no intention of filing any taxes, had engaged in a pattern of activity
to frustrate the IRS's collection activities, and had not proposed a feasible plan
in the currentbankruptcy.145 In reaching these conclusions, the court considered
a number of factors that should be taken into consideration when making the
determination as to whether a petition was filed in bad faith, including: the
nature of the debt, the timing of the petition, how the debt arose, the debtor's
motives in filing the petition, how the debtor's actions affected creditors, the
debtor's treatment of creditors both before and after the petition was filed, and
whether the debtor has been forthcoming with the bankruptcy court and the
creditors. 46 With only some variations, courts use these factors in analyzing
bad faith for both dismissal of a case and confirmation of a plan.147 Thus, while
142. Id. § 9-14, at 707.
143. See, e.g., In re Marcellus, No. 95-3451, 1997 WL 464100, at *1 (7th Cir. Aug.
4, 1997); Harker v. United States, No. 96-3620, 1997 WL 199507, at *I (8th Cir. Apr. 7, 1997)
(affirming the lower court's dismissal of Chapter 13 filed "'as a litigation tactic to avoid posting
an appeal bond [thatwas otherwise necessary] to postpone assessment by the IRS'); Greatwood
v. IRS (In re Greatwood), 120 F.3d 268 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming dismissal of Chapter 13 for
bad faith in failing to file tax returns and to propose a Chapterl3 plan that included payments to
the IRS).
144. In re Marcellus, 1997 WL 464100, at *1.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *2.
147. See, e.g., Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d
885 (11 th Cir. 1983). The Eleventh Circuit articulates some of the factors to be considered in
determining a debtor's good faith. These factors include the following:
(1) the amount of the debtor's income from all sources;
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some courts follow the plain language of the statutes by not imposing a good
faith requirement on the filing of a Chapter 13,' 4' a number of courts have
simply combined the question of whether the plan should not be confirmed
because it was propounded in bad faith with the question of whether the case
should be dismissed because it was filed in bad faith.
For example, in In re Crayton49 the Chapter 13 trustee objected to the
confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan based on the debtor's failure to
file tax returns before the filing of his Chapter 13 plan coupled with the failure
for six months after filing the Chapter 13 plan to comply with federal law by
filing the returns. The court conducted an analysis of good faith under
§ 1325(a)(3) and found that the debtor's failure to file tax returns constituted
"unmistakable manifestations of bad faith" and ultimately dismissed the case
based on this finding of bad faith.'5 °
Similarly, in In re Paulson's' the court was faced with an objection to
confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan filed by the IRS and with a
motion to dismiss, filed by the Chapter 13 trustee. The Paulson debtor had
failed to file tax returns or had filed "protest" tax returns, claiming the
protection of the Fifth Amendment, for eleven years.'52 Ultimately, the IRS
responded by levying upon the debtor's wages." 3 The debtor reacted by filing
(2) the living expenses of the debtor and his dependents;
(3) the amount of attorney's fees;
(4) the probable or expected duration of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan;
(5) the motivations of the debtor and his sincerity in seeking relief
under the provisions of Chapter 13;
(6) the debtor's degree of effort;
(7) the debtor's ability to earn and the likelihood of fluctuation in his
earnings;
(8) special circumstances such as inordinate medical expense;
(9) the frequency with which the debtor has soughit relief under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act and its predecessors;
(10) the circumstances under which the debtor has contracted his debts
and his demonstrated bona fides, or lack of same, in dealings with
his creditors; [and]
(11) the burden which the plan's administration would place on the
trustee.
Id. at 888-89. These factors have become known as the "totality of the circumstances" test,
which has been adopted by a number of other courts. See, e.g., Handeen v. LeMaire (In re
LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1348 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1988);
Metro Employees Credit Union v. Okoreeh-Baah (In re Okoree-Baah), 836 F.2d 1030,1032 (6th
Cir. 1988); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1986);_In re Verdunn, 160 B.R. 682,
688 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re March, 83 B.R. 270, 273 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988).
148. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Flick (In re Flick), 14 B.R. 912, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1981) (finding no requirement that a Chapter 13 petition be filed in good faith, but only the
requirement that the plan be proposed in good faith).
149. 169 B.R. 243, 244 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
150. Id. at 245.
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a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 and receiving a Chapter 7 discharge
which, pursuant to § 727, did not discharge the debtor's tax liabilities.
54
Therefore, the IRS levied on the debtor's wages a second time after the Chapter
7 had been concluded.'55 Thereafter, the debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition,
which was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and the levies continued.'56 The
debtor finally filed a Chapter 13 case in the proper jurisdiction to stop the IRS
collection activities. 57 The plan the IRS objected to proposed that the debtor
pay only the priority tax claims over five years without interest. 5 The
remaining tax claims were to go unpaid.
59
The court began with an analysis of whether the plan had been proposed
in good faith based on the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the
case.' 60 The court explained that where the debt to be discharged under the
Chapter 13 could not be discharged under a Chapter 7, it would closely
scrutinize the debtor's motivation and any other relevant factors in considering
whether good faith exists.'" The court found that because the debtor's pre-
petition "flouting of tax laws" was the sole source of his indebtedness, and
because the debtor's plan proposed to satisfy none of the liabilities, except
those mandated by § 507, the debtor was attempting to manipulate unfairly the
Bankruptcy Code. 62 Therefore, the court sustained the IRS's objection to
confirmation and granted the Chapter 13 Trustee's motion to dismiss the
case.
163
InIn reLove'" the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a finding that
the Chapter 13 petition was not filed in good faith, warranting dismissal of the
case where the debtor's tax protest activity resulted in the debtor's primary
source of indebtedness, and where the sole benefit and purpose for filing the
Chapter 13 petition was to avoid federal tax liability. The court found "filing
a Chapter 13 petition in order to thwart the payment of an otherwise
nondischargeable income tax debt arising from the unlawful failure to pay
income taxes [is] not one of the intended purposes of the bankruptcy
provisions."'
165
Likewise, in In re Hazel'66the debtor was a tax protester who failed to file
income tax returns for seven years and filed withholding forms with his




157. Id. at 497-98.




162. Id. at 499-500.
163. Id. at 500.
164. 957 F.2d 1350 (7th Cir. 1992).
165. Id. at 1359.
166. 68 B.R. 287 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), affd, 95 B.R. 481 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
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law. His activities resulted in a $36,043 tax liability to the IRS. 67 The court
found that despite the debtors abandonment of his tax protester status and
acknowledged his obligation to pay text debts, the plan had been filed in bad
faith, and, pursuant to § 1325(a)(3), the court dismissed the case.168
In Schaffner v. IRS 69 the court found that the debtor's plan, which sought
to discharge over eighty-five percent of the debtor's outstanding tax liability,
could not have been proposed in good faith, given the debtor's past tax
protestation activities and continued attempts to evade paying taxes. Again, the
court denied confirmation of a plan and upheld the dismissal of the debtor's
case.
170
Given the laundry list of cases where tax protesters have been denied the
protections and benefits of the Chapter 13 filing, courts, for the most part,
appear unwilling to lend assistance to those seeking to avoid the payment of
taxes. Courts generally find this avoidance of taxes is an unfair manipulation
of the Bankruptcy Code which they will not condone. Nonetheless, all of these
courts seem to contemplate that in certain circumstances it mightbe appropriate
to allow a case to continue, and even to confirm a plan as being proposed in
good faith although confirmation would discharge a portion of the debtor's tax
liability.
For example, in In re Verdunn17 1 the debtor filed a voluntary petition for
relief under Chapter 13 after pleading guilty to two criminal counts of false
statements and perjury under section 7206(1) of Title 26 of the United States
Code. In addition, the debtor had received an IRS notice of deficiency for
underpayment of taxes due to fraud for the years 1982 to 1985. This
underpayment was due to negligence, delinquency penalties, penalties for
negligence for 1986, and interest claims for all of the years at issue.172 The
debtor's proposed plan provided for payment only for twenty percent of the tax
claims. 7 Despite these facts, the court refused to be persuaded that "a debtor
has a plan to defraud the Government where expenses and debts have been
accurately stated, and there has been no showing of fraudulent
misrepresentation in seeking relief under Chapter 13.,',17 The inquiry the court
undertook was to determine whether the debtor sought to abuse the bankruptcy
laws by employing them for a purpose for which they were not intended.
Rather than finding the debtor was abusing the system, the court found that the
debtor was simply exercising his right to use the system strategically. 17 Thus,
while the court had to address other issues prior to a final determination, it was
167. Id. 68 B.R. at 288.
168. Id. at 290.
169. 95 B.R. 62 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
170. Id. at 65.
171. 160 B.R. 682 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
172. Id. at 684.





Williams and Ogier: A Collusion of Policy: Chapter 13 and Taxes
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
"unwilling on aper se basis to find a lack of good faith merely where a debtor
is seeking to discharge Tax Claims, albeit fraudulent, especially where the
Bankruptcy Code gives certain dispensations."'" 6 This possibility illustrated in
Verdunn-that under certain circumstances a tax protester could propose a
Chapter 13 plan which discharges all or most of the debtor's tax
liabilities-highlights the deficiency with the good faith approach: the risk,
and even the likelihood, that courts will disagree over what types of conduct
constitute good faith.
For example, in In re Lilley'71 the district court held that cause existed for
the dismissal of a debtor's Chapter 13 case based on the debtor's prepetition tax
fraud.'78 However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
prepetition tax fraud cannot support a bad faith dismissal of a Chapter 13
petition.' 79 The district court also found that although the plan sought to
discharge taxes previously found nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 case and that
the plan proposed minimal payments to the IRS, these facts were insufficient
to show that the plan was proposed in bad faith.'80
The need to debate precisely how, under Chapter 13, a court should
dismiss a petition for relief because of fraudulent tax activity provides strong
evidence that the good faith requirement cannot provide the assurance
necessary to prevent abuse. Furthermore, the signal that the Bankruptcy Code
sends by making fraudulent taxes presumptively dischargeable in a Chapter 13
case is a bad one. A more direct approach to sanctioning fraudulent tax
behavior is in order.
IV. PROPOSED MODEL
This Part analyzes the proposals considered by the Tax Advisory
Committee to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission relating to the
Chapter 13 discharge and taxes. It builds upon one of the proposals rejected by
both the Advisory Committee and the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission ("NBRC"), arguing that the proposal provides the most sensible
approach to reconciling the tension between tax liabilities and the Chapter 13
discharge.
A. National Bankruptcy Review Commission Proposals
The NBRC, through recommendations by the Tax Advisory Committee,
has addressed the use of and perceived abuses of Chapter 13 to avoid tax
176. Id.
177. 185 B.R. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev'd, 91 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1996).
178. Id. at 494.
179. See Lilley, 91 F.3d at 496.
180. Lilley, 185 B.R. at 496-97, rev'd, 91 F.3d at 491.
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liabilities.' The several proposals consideredby the Advisory Committee and
by the Commission were highly controversial and often failed to achieve a
consensus result. For example, Proposal No. 213 addressed the scope of the
Chapter 13 discharge as it relates to tax claims. 82 The first proposal was simply
to retain the current Chapter 13 superdischarge. 8 3 The second proposal,
favored by the IRS, was to conform the discharge of Chapter 13 to that of
Chapter 7, thus excepting most taxes from discharge." 4 The third proposal,
more modest than the IRS proposal, would circumscribe the discharge and
deny it to those debtors who defrauded the government.' 5 This Article adopts
this third proposal as the model of discharge. The first proposal sought the
retention of the current superdischarge in Chapter 13.186 The arguments in favor
of the superdischarge are well known and forceful. Chapter 13 provides a more
robust discharge in return for at least as great a recovery for creditors as they
would have received in a Chapter 7 case. 8 7 The superdischarge breathes life
into the fundamental bankruptcy policy of providing an individual debtor a
fresh start. However, the arguments against a robust discharge weaken
significantly where a debtor has engaged in tax fraud. Dishonest debtors do not
deserve and should not receive a fresh start.
The second proposal sought to eliminate the superdischarge of priority
taxes in a Chapter 13 case. This proposal aligned the Chapter 13 exceptions to
discharge with those of Chapter 7 and of an individual under Chapter 11. The
Bankruptcy Code now discharges a Chapter 13 debtor from taxes that are
provided for by the plan or are disallowed under § 502288 Several courts have
held that priority taxes mentioned in the plan are "provided for" and can be
discharged whether or not they are actually paid. 9 Similarly, claims for
priority taxes that have been disallowed in the bankruptcy proceeding under
§ 502 and that would not be dischargeable in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case
have been held to be dischargeable because they were mentioned in the Chapter
13 plan. 90 The problem most often arises in those cases in which the IRS filed
its claim in an untimely manner' 9' or where the IRS failed to file a claim at
all.'92 The IRS's most serious concern occurs with derivative liabilities, such
181. See TAX ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 56-59.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 56.
184. Id. at 56-57.
185. Id. at 57-58.
186. See id. at 56.
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1994).
188. Id. § 1328(a).
189. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., Border v. IRS (In re Border), 116 B.R. 588 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990);
Ledlin v. United States (In re Tomlan), 102 B.R. 790 (E.D. Wash. 1989), aff'dper curiam, 907
F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990).
192. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 78 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1987).
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as the trust fund recovery penalty,'93 under which the debt is prepetition but the
determination of liability does not occur until after the bar date. Additionally,
under present law a Chapter 13 debtor may obtain a discharge for taxes
fraudulently underreported or evaded more than three years from the petition
date. 94 Certain tax penalties can also be discharged under Chapter 13, although
those same taxes and penalties would not be dischargeable for individuals in
a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case.
B. Proposed Model
The third proposal made by the Advisory Committee is the model
embraced by this Article. This proposal sought to amend § 1328(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code
to deny a discharge to those Chapter 13 debtors who have
filed fraudulent returns or who have engaged in an
affirmative act or acts in an attempt to willfully and
fraudulently evade a tax where the governmental unit proves
in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law the
fraudulent conduct in the bankruptcy case.'95
Proponents of this third proposal recognized "that taxing authorities receive a
greater recovery in Chapter 13 cases than they do in Chapter 7 cases."'96 In
fact, the Bankruptcy Code recognizes this consequence in Chapter 13 cases and
provides incentives for individual debtors to seek relief under Chapter 13.'
These incentives include relief from postpetition interest on unsecured tax
claims, an expanded scope of the automatic stay, and the broad discharge in
§ 1328(a).' 98 These incentives for filing under Chapter 13 as opposed to
Chapter 7 should be continued. Thus, a broader scope of discharge is justified
under Chapter 13, and the IRS proposal should be rejected.
At the same time, the Chapter 13 process should not provide a haven from
tax liabilities for taxpayers that have defrauded a governmental authority.
Although the requirement that any Chapter 13 plan must be proposed in good
faith may operate as a gate to prevent abuses of the bankruptcy process by tax
protestors and defrauders, courts are not in agreement on the meaning of good
faith in these circumstances and present law lacks clarity. 99 Thus, a specific
amendment to § 1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is necessary to except tax
193. See I.R.C. § 6672 (1994).
194. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(I)(C), 1328(a) (1994).
195. TAx ADVISORY COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 57-58. As Chair of the
Advisory Committee, the author suggested the third proposal.
196. Id. at 57.
197. See II U.S.C. § 1305(a).
198. See id. §§ 1305, 1328(a).
199. See supra Part III.C.
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claims involving fraudulent returns or conduct from Chapter 13 discharge
where the government proves, in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy
law, the fraudulent conduct in the bankruptcy case."'
The Commission also considered Proposal No. 602, which sought to
clarify the exception to discharge in § 523(a)(1)(C) regarding a "willful[]
attempt in any manner to evade or defeat [a] tax., 2 ' This proposal should be
an essential element of a modification of the Chapter 13 discharge as detailed
above. Essentially, in a bankruptcy case, this proposal requires a taxing
authority to show an affirmative act of misconduct accompanied by the
requisite intent. The term "willful" as used in § 523(a)(1)(C) would require that
a finding of willful attempt to evade or to defeat a tax must be supported by an
affirmative act as evidence of wrongful intention to avoid paying a lawful tax.
Passive omissions such as failure to file or failure to pay should not be
sufficient to support a finding of "willful" under § 523(a)(1)(C). Moreover, it
would be incorrect to read the requirement of an "affirmative act" to mean only
a de minimis act. The act must be practically and legally significant to the tax
evasion. This proposal is consistent with the notion that the honest debtor is
deserving of the bankruptcy discharge and reestablishment as a productive and
taxpaying member of society.
Those opposed to the proposal argued that a legislative effort to define
willful behavior under § 523(a)(1)(C) "will neither reduce nor streamline
litigation.... . 2 2 According to the opponents, "[t]he inquiry must always be
fact specific in each case."2 3 Additionally, the requirement of proof of an
affirnative act has been rejected by the majority of courts that have addressed
the issue.2
In the haste to draw battle lines, we should be careful to acknowledge that
the two camps are not too far apart. In fact, a quick perusal ofpending litigation
in the area would suggest that the "unofficial" position, if there is such a thing,
of the federal government is to litigate those cases where the debtor has
engaged in affirnative acts of misconduct. To be sure, some exceptions exist,
but those cases are exceptions. Both the private bar and the taxing authorities
could benefit from some reasonable compromise and consensus.
200. By votes of eight to two and six to four, the Advisory Committee recommended
the rejection of the second and third proposals, which state the IRS proposal and the proposal
suggesting modest changes to the Chapter 13 discharge, respectively. However, the Advisory
Committee failed to reach a majority on the first proposal, which would retain the Chapter 13
superdischarge in all respects. As to the first proposal, four members voted in favor, four voted
against, and two abstained. When asked to state a preference for one of the proposals, four
members favored the first, four members favored the third, and two members favored the second.
See TAX ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58-59.
201. Id. at 116.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Dalton v. IRS, 77 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1996); Bruner v. United
States (In re Bruner), 55 F.3d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1995).
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V. CONCLUSION
More than 1.4 million Americans filed for relief under the Bankruptcy
Code in 1998.2"' Tennessee will witness over one bankruptcy filing for every
fifty households; Georgia, one in every fifty-five households; Alabama, one in
fifty-nine; Nevada, one in sixty-eight; California, one in seventy-three. Of these
states, the top three also administer twice as many Chapter 13 cases as they do
Chapter 7 cases."'
Virtually all individuals who file for relief under Chapters 7 or 13 seek the
discharge. The bankruptcy discharge operates as apermanent injunction against
the enforcement, by formal or informal means, of all dischargeable debts owed
by the debtor." 7 The discharge is at the heart of the fresh start policy promoted
by the Bankruptcy Code. Although a relatively recent addition to bankruptcy
law, the discharge has become firmly entrenched in the logic and lore of
bankruptcy law and practice. Nevertheless, that lore also states that the
discharge is reserved for the honest but unfortunate debtor. Many of the
objections to the discharge in a Chapter 7 case square neatly with this maxim.
For example, the discharge can be denied for hiding assets, failing to keep
adequate financial records, debtor misconduct, and an inability to satisfactorily
explain any losses or deficiencies of assets." 8 Furthermore, those claims
identified as nondischargeable under § 523(a) survive the Chapter 7 discharge.
Section 523(a) claims include tax fraud, tax claims, breaches of fiduciary
duties, and intentional torts.209 However, the superdischarge in a Chapter 13
case fails to square with the traditional notions of discharge reserved to the
honest but unfortunate debtor. Under § 1328(a) almost all debts of the debtor
are discharged, even willful misconduct claims are nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)."0 To be sure, a Chapter 13 plan must be proposed in good faith, but
good faith is too thin a wedge on which to build a policy to prevent abuse.
Thus, the Chapter 13 debtor receives a windfall: The debtor may discharge
debts that could not be discharged in a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 case, debts that
should not be dischargeable at all if honesty and discharge remain linked.
205. American Bankruptcy Institute World, Filing Statistics (visited Mar. 17, 1999)
<http://www.abiworld.org/stats/newstatsfront.html>.
206. Id.
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1994).
208. See id. §§ 727(a), 1141(d)(1)(C).
209. Id. § 523(a).
210. See id. §§ 523(a), 1328(a).
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